Free CFA Institute CFA-Level-III Exam Questions

Dynamic Investment Services (DIS) is a global, full-service investment advisory firm based in the United States. Although the firm provides numerous investment services, DIS specializes in portfolio management for individual and institutional clients and only deals in publicly traded debt, equity, and derivative instruments. Walter Fried, CFA, is a portfolio manager and the director of DIS's offices in Austria. For several years, Fried has maintained a relationship with a local tax consultant. The consultant provides a DIS marketing brochure with Fried's contact information to his clients seeking investment advisory services, and in return. Fried manages the consultant's personal portfolio and informs the consultant of potential tax issues in the referred clients' portfolios as they occur. Because he cannot personally manage all of the inquiring clients' assets, Fried generally passes the client information along to one of his employees but never discloses his relationship with the tax accountant. Fried recently forwarded information on the prospective Jones Family Trust account to Beverly Ulster, CFA, one of his newly hired portfolio managers. Upon receiving the information, Ulster immediately set up a meeting with Terrence Phillips, the trustee of the Jones Family Trust. Ulster began the meeting by explaining DIS's investment services as detailed in the firm's approved marketing and public relations literature. Ulster also had Phillips complete a very detailed questionnaire regarding the risk and return objectives, investment constraints, and other information related to the trust beneficiaries, which Phillips is not. While reading the questionnaire, Ulster learned that Phillips heard about DIS's services through a referral from his tax consultant. Upon further investigation, Ulster discovered the agreement set up between Fried and the tax consultant, which is legal according to Austrian law but was not disclosed by either party Ulster took a break from the meeting to get more details from Fried. With full information on the referral arrangement, Ulster immediately makes full disclosure to the Phillips. Before the meeting with Phillips concluded, Ulster began formalizing the investment policy statement (IPS) for the Jones Family Trust and agreed to Phillips' request that the IPS should explicitly forbid derivative positions in the Trust portfolio. A few hours after meeting with the Jones Family Trust representative, Ulster accepted another new referral client, Steven West, from Fried. Following DIS policy, Ulster met with West to address his investment objectives and constraints and explain the firm's services. During the meeting, Ulster informed West that DIS offers three levels of account status, each with an increasing fee based on the account's asset value. The first level has the lowest account fees but receives oversubscribed domestic IPO allocations only after the other two levels receive IPO allocations. The second-level clients have the same priority as third-level clients with respect to oversubscribed domestic IPO allocations and receive research with significantly greater detail than first-level clients. Clients who subscribe to the third level of DIS services receive the most detailed research reports and are allowed to participate in both domestic and international IPOs. All clients receive research and recommendations at approximately the same lime. West decided to engage DIS's services as a second-level client. While signing the enrollment papers, West told Ulster, "If you can give me the kind of performance I am looking for, I may move the rest of my assets to DIS." When Ulster inquired about the other accounts, West would not specify how much or what type of assets he held in other accounts. West also noted that a portion of the existing assets to be transferred to Ulster's control were private equity investments in small start-up companies, which DIS would need to manage. Ulster assured him that DIS would have no problem managing the private equity investments. After her meeting with West, Ulster attended a weekly strategy session held by DIS. All managers were required to attend this particular meeting since the focus was on a new strategy designed to reduce portfolio volatility while slightly enhancing return using a combination of futures and options on various asset classes. Intrigued by the idea, Ulster implemented the strategy for all of her clients and achieved positive results for all portfolios. Ulster's average performance results after one year of using the new strategy are presented in Figure 1. For comparative purposes, performance figures without the new strategy are also presented.At the latest strategy meeting, DIS economists were extremely pessimistic about emerging market economies and suggested that the firm's portfolio managers consider selling emerging market securities out of their portfolios and avoid these investments for the next 12 to 15 months. Fried placed a limit order to sell his personal holdings of an emerging market fund at a price 5% higher than the market price at the time. He then began selling his clients' (all of whom have discretionary accounts with DIS) holdings of the same emerging market fund using market orders. All of his clients' trade orders were completed just before the price of the fund declined sharply by 13%, causing Fried's order to remain unfilled. Does the referral agreement between Fried and the tax consultant violate any CFA Institute Standards of Professional Conduct?

Daniel Castillo and Ramon Diaz are chief investment officers at Advanced Advisors (AA), a boutique fixedincome firm based in the United States. AA employs numerous quantitative models to invest in both domesticand international securities.During the week, Castillo and Diaz consult with one of their investors, Sally Michaels. Michaels currently holds a$10,000,000 fixed-income position that is selling at par. The maturity is 20 years, and the coupon rate of 7% ispaid semiannually. Her coupons can be reinvested at 8%. Castillo is looking at various interest rate changescenarios, and one such scenario is where the interest rate on the bonds immediately changes to 8%.Diaz is considering using a repurchase agreement to leverage Michaels's portfolio. Michaels is concerned,however, with not understanding the factors that impact the interest rate, or repo rate, used in her strategy. Inresponse, Castillo explains the factors that affect the repo rate and makes the following statements:1. "The repo rate is directly related to the maturity of the repo, inversely related to the quality of the collateral,and directly related to the maturity of the collateral. U.S. Treasury bills are often purchased by Treasury dealersusing repo transactions, and since they have high liquidity, short maturities, and no default risk, the repo rate isusually quite low. "2. "The greater control the lender has over the collateral, the lower the repo rate. If the availability of thecollateral is limited, the repo rate will be higher."Castillo consults with an institutional investor, the Washington Investment Fund, on the effect of leverage onbond portfolio returns as well as their bond portfolio's sensitivity to changes in interest rates. The portfolio underdiscussion is well diversified, with small positions in a large number of bonds. It has a duration of 7.2. Of the$200 million value of the portfolio, $60 million was borrowed. The duration of borrowed funds is 0.8. Theexpected return on the portfolio is 8% and the cost of borrowed funds is 3%.The next day, the chief investment officer for the Washington Investment Fund expresses her concern aboutthe risk of their portfolio, given its leverage. She inquires about the various risk measures for bond portfolios. Inresponse, Diaz distinguishes between the standard deviation and downside risk measures, making thefollowing statements:1. ''Portfolio managers complain that using variance to calculate Sharpe ratios is inappropriate. Since itconsiders all returns over the entire distribution, variance and the resulting standard deviation are artificiallyinflated, so the resulting Sharpe ratio is artificially deflated. Since it is easily calculated for bond portfolios,managers feci a more realistic measure of risk is the semi-variance, which measures the distribution of returnsbelow a given return, such as the mean or a hurdle rate."2. "A shortcoming of VAR is its inability to predict the size of potential losses in the lower tail of the expectedreturn distribution. Although it can assign a probability to some maximum loss, it does not predict the actual lossif the maximum loss is exceeded. If Washington Investment Fund is worried about catastrophic loss, shortfallrisk is a more appropriate measure, because it provides the probability of not meeting a target return."AA has a corporate client, Shaifer Materials with a €20,000,000 bond outstanding that pays an annual fixedcoupon rate of 9.5% with a 5-year maturity. Castillo believes that euro interest rates may decrease further withinthe next year below the coupon rate on the fixed rate bond. Castillo would like Shaifer to issue new debt at alower euro interest rate in the future. Castillo has, however, looked into the costs of calling the bonds and hasfound that the call premium is quite high and that the investment banking costs of issuing new floating rate debtwould be quite steep. As such he is considering using a swaption to create a synthetic refinancing of the bondat a lower cost than an actual refinancing of the bond. He states that in order to do so, Shaifer should buy apayer swaption, which would give them the option to pay a lower floating interest rate if rates drop.Diaz retrieves current market data for payer and receiver swaptions with a maturity of one year. The terms ofeach instrument are provided below:Payer swaption fixed rate7.90%Receiver swaption fixed rate7.60%Current Euribor7.20%Projected Euribor in one year5.90%Diaz states that, assuming Castillo is correct, Shaifer can exercise a swaption in one year to effectively call intheir old fixed rate euro debt paying 9.5% and refinance at a floating rate, which would be 7.5% in one year.Regarding their statements concerning the synthetic refinancing of the Shaifer Materials fixed rate euro debt,are the comments correct?

Joan Nicholson, CFA, and Kim Fluellen, CFA, sit on the risk management committee for Thomasville AssetManagement. Although Thomasville manages the majority of its investable assets, it also utilizes outside firmsfor special situations such as market neutral and convertible arbitrage strategies. Thomasville has hired ahedge fund, Boston Advisors, for both of these strategies. The managers for the Boston Advisors funds areFrank Amato, CFA, and Joseph Garvin, CFA. Amato uses a market neutral strategy and has generated a returnof S20 million this year on the $100 million Thomasville has invested with him. Garvin uses a convertiblearbitrage strategy and has lost $15 million this year on the $200 million Thomasville has invested with him, withmost of the loss coming in the last quarter of the year. Thomasville pays each outside manager an incentive feeof 20% on profits. During the risk management committee meeting Nicholson evaluates the characteristics ofthe arrangement with Boston Advisors. Nicholson states that the asymmetric nature of Thomasville's contractwith Boston Advisors creates adverse consequences for Thomasville's net profits and that the compensationcontract resembles a put option owned by Boston Advisors.Upon request, Fluellen provides a risk assessment for the firm's large cap growth portfolio using a monthlydollar VAR. To do so, Fluellen obtains the following statistics from the fund manager. The value of the fund is$80 million and has an annual expected return of 14.4%. The annual standard deviation of returns is 21.50%.Assuming a standard normal distribution, 5% of the potential portfolio values are 1.65 standard deviationsbelow the expected return.Thomasville periodically engages in options trading for hedging purposes or when they believe that options aremispriced. One of their positions is a long position in a call option for Moffett Corporation. The option is aEuropean option with a 3-month maturity. The underlying stock price is $27 and the strike price of the option is$25. The option sells for S2.86. Thomasville has also sold a put on the stock of the McNeill Corporation. Theoption is an American option with a 2-month maturity. The underlying stock price is $52 and the strike price ofthe option is $55. The option sells for $3.82. Fluellen assesses the credit risk of these options to Thomasvilleand states that the current credit risk of the Moffett option is $2.86 and the current credit risk of the McNeilloption is $3.82.Thomasville also uses options quite heavily in their Special Strategies Portfolio. This portfolio seeks to exploitmispriced assets using the leverage provided by options contracts. Although this fund has achieved somespectacular returns, it has also produced some rather large losses on days of high market volatility. Nicholsonhas calculated a 5% VAR for the fund at $13.9 million. In most years, the fund has produced losses exceeding$13.9 million in 13 of the 250 trading days in a year, on average. Nicholson is concerned about the accuracy ofthe estimated VAR because when the losses exceed $13.9 million, they are typically much greater than $13.9million.In addition to using options, Thomasville also uses swap contracts for hedging interest rate risk and currencyexposures. Fluellen has been assigned the task of evaluating the credit risk of these contracts. Thecharacteristics of the swap contracts Thomasville uses are shown in Figure 1.Fluellen later is asked to describe credit risk in general to the risk management committee. She states thatcross-default provisions generally protect a creditor because they prevent a debtor from declaring immediatedefault on the obligation owed to the creditor when the debtor defaults on other obligations. Fluellen also statesthat credit risk and credit VAR can be quickly calculated because bond rating firms provide extensive data onthe defaults for investment grade and junk grade corporate debt at reasonable prices.Which of the following best describes the accuracy of the VAR measure calculated for the Special StrategiesPortfolio?

Pace Insurance is a large, multi-line insurance company that also owns several proprietary mutual funds. Thefunds are managed individually, but Pace has an investment committee that oversees all of the funds. Thiscommittee is responsible for evaluating the performance of the funds relative to appropriate benchmarks andrelative to the stated investment objectives of each individual fund. During a recent investment committeemeeting, the poor performance of Pace's equity mutual funds was discussed. In particular, the inability of theportfolio managers to outperform their benchmarks was highlighted. The net conclusion of the committee wasto review the performance of the manager responsible for each fund and dismiss those managers whoseperformance had lagged substantially behind the appropriate benchmark.The fund with the worst relative performance is the Pace Mid-Cap Fund, which invests in stocks with acapitalization between S40 billion and $80 billion. A review of the operations of the fund found the following:• The turnover of the fund was almost double that of other similar style mutual funds.• The fund's portfolio manager solicited input from her entire staff prior to making any decision to sell an existingholding.• The beta of the Pace Mid-Cap Fund's portfolio was 60% higher than the beta of other similar style mutualfunds.• No stock is considered for purchase in the Mid-Cap Fund unless the portfolio manager has 15 years offinancial information on that company, plus independent research reports from at least three different analysts.• The portfolio manager refuses to increase her technology sector weighting because of past losses the fundincurred in the sector.• The portfolio manager sold all the fund's energy stocks as the price per barrel of oil rose above $80. Sheexpects oil prices to fall back to the $40 to S50 per barrel range.A committee member made the following two comments:Comment 1: "One reason for the poor recent performance of the Mid-Cap Mutual Fund is that the portfoliolacks recognizable companies. I believe that good companies make good investments."Comment 2: "The portfolio manager of the Mid-Cap Mutual Fund refuses to acknowledge her mistakes. Sheseems to sell stocks that appreciate, but hold stocks that have declined in value."The supervisor of the Mid-Cap Mutual Fund portfolio manager made the following statements:Statement 1: "The portfolio manager of the Mid-Cap Mutual Fund has engaged in quarter-end window dressingto make her portfolio look better to investors. The portfolio manager's action is a behavioral trait known as overreaction."Statement 2: "Each time the portfolio manager of the Mid-Cap Mutual fund trades a stock, she executes thetrade by buying or selling one-third of the position at a time, with the trades spread over three months. Theportfolio manager's action is a behavioral trait known as anchoring."Indicate whether Statement 1 and Statement 2 made by the supervisor are correct.

Carl Cramer is a recent hire at Derivatives Specialists Inc. (DSI), a small consulting firm that advises a varietyof institutions on the management of credit risk. Some of DSI's clients are very familiar with risk managementtechniques whereas others are not. Cramer has been assigned the task of creating a handbook on credit risk,its possible impact, and its management. His immediate supervisor, Christine McNally, will assist Cramer in thecreation of the handbook and will review it. Before she took a position at DSI, McNally advised banks and otherinstitutions on the use of value-at-risk (VAR) as well as credit-at-risk (CAR).Cramer's first task is to address the basic dimensions of credit risk. He states that the first dimension of creditrisk is the probability of an event that will cause a loss. The second dimension of credit risk is the amount lost,which is a function of the dollar amount recovered when a loss event occurs. Cramer recalls the considerabledifficulty he faced when transacting with Johnson Associates, a firm which defaulted on a contract with theGrich Company. Grich forced Johnson Associates into bankruptcy and Johnson Associates was declared indefault of all its agreements. Unfortunately, DSI then had to wait until the bankruptcy court decided on all claimsbefore it could settle the agreement with Johnson Associates.McNally mentions that Cramer should include a statement about the time dimension of credit risk. She statesthat the two primary time dimensions of credit risk are current and future. Current credit risk relates to thepossibility of default on current obligations, while future credit risk relates to potential default on futureobligations. If a borrower defaults and claims bankruptcy, a creditor can file claims representing the face valueof current obligations and the present value of future obligations. Cramer adds that combining current andpotential credit risk analysis provides the firm's total credit risk exposure and that current credit risk is usually areliable predictor of a borrower's potential credit risk.As DSI has clients with a variety of forward contracts, Cramer then addresses the credit risks associated withforward agreements. Cramer states that long forward contracts gain in value when the market price of theunderlying increases above the contract price. McNally encourages Cramer to include an example of credit riskand forward contracts in the handbook. She offers the following:A forward contract sold by Palmer Securities has six months until the delivery date and a contract price of 50.The underlying asset has no cash flows or storage costs and is currently priced at 50. In the contract, no fundswere exchanged upfront.Cramer also describes how a client firm of DSI can control the credit risks in their derivatives transactions. Hewrites that firms can make use of netting arrangements, create a special purpose vehicle, require collateralfrom counterparties, and require a mark-to-market provision. McNally adds that Cramer should include adiscussion of some newer forms of credit protection in his handbook. McNally thinks credit derivativesrepresent an opportunity for DSL She believes that one type of credit derivative that should figure prominently intheir handbook is total return swaps. She asserts that to purchase protection through a total return swap, theholder of a credit asset will agree to pass the total return on the asset to the protection seller (e.g., a swapdealer) in exchange for a single, fixed payment representing the discounted present value of expected cashflows from the asset.A DSI client, Weaver Trading, has a bond that they are concerned will increase in credit risk. Weaver would likeprotection against this event in the form of a payment if the bond's yield spread increases beyond LIBOR plus3%. Weaver Trading prefers a cash settlement.Later that week, Cramer and McNally visit a client's headquarters and discuss the potential hedge of a bondissued by Cuellar Motors. Cuellar manufactures and markets specialty luxury motorcycles. The client isconsidering hedging the bond using a credit spread forward, because he is concerned that a downturn in theeconomy could result in a default on the Cuellar bond. The client holds $2,000,000 in par of the Cuellar bondand the bond's coupons are paid annually. The bond's current spread over the U.S. Treasury rate is 2.5%. Thecharacteristics of the forward contract are shown below.Information on the Credit Spread ForwardRegarding their statements concerning current and future credit risk, determine whether Cramer and McNallyare correct or incorrect.